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Introductory remarks 
 
During the last thirty years Arnold Hauser was scarcely present in art 
historiography. There is a new wave1 to redeem the relevance of his sweeping-
synthetic way of thinking informed by the conceptual framework of German idealist 
aesthetics, fin de siècle Neo-Kantianism, and by various forms of Hungarian social 
thought from the early 1900s. Recent scholarship has put forward the 
reinterpretation of his method that was often subject to a host of contentions. 
Hauser’s oeuvre is still rich in resources for a study of twentieth century European 
intellectual history and conveys new points for future research. His years in Britain 
are part of these resources. Despite the very insightful work of Tom Steel2 mapping 
the scholarly communities Hauser was in touch with between 1938 and 1977, a great 
deal of investigation has to be done in this field. Hauser’s probably best known 
book (The Social History of Art from 1951) had a vast impact on the Anglophone 
world, but his exact position in the history of twentieth century intelligentsia 
(moreover, in the community of German speaking East-Central European émigrés 
in Cold War England) is still not completely clarified. Even more, the reception of 
his post-1951 works is almost completely uncharted. 
The following original articles were all published by the Times Literary 
Supplement (TLS) in 1965. They document the trenchant assessment of Arnold 
Hauser’s Mannerism-book (also available in the German original from 1964)3 
 
1 See: Paul Stirton, ‘The Vienna School in Hungary. Antal, Wilde, and Fülep’, Journal of Art 
Historiography, 8, June 13, 2013.; Robert Born, ‘The World Art Histories and the Cold War’, 
Journal of Art Historiography, 9, December 13, 2013.; Csilla Markója, ‘The Young Arnold 
Hauser and the Sunday Circle: The publication of Hauser’s estate preserved in Hungary’, 
Journal of Art Historiography, 21, December 2019. 
Hauser’s position in the history of aesthetic theory, epistemology, and in the theory of 
science has also undergone serious revision (Cf.: Tamás Demeter, A szociologizáló hagyomány. 
A magyar filozófia főárama a 20. században [The Sociological Tradition. The Main Current of 
Twentieth Century Hungarian Philosophy], Budapest: Századvég, 2011; Axel Gelfert, ‘Art 
history, the Problem of Style, and Arnold Hauser’s Contribution to the History and 
Sociology of Knowledge’, Studies in East European Thought, 64, 2012, 121–142.) 
2 Tom Steele, ’Arnold Hauser, Herbert Read and the Social History of Art in Britain’, Britain 
and Hungary 3. Contacts in architecture design, art, and theory, Ed. Gyula Ernyey, Budapest: 
Hungarian University of Craft and Design, 2005, 236–253. 
3 Arnold Hauser, Der Manierismus. Die Krise der Renaissance und der Ursprung der modernen 
Kunst, München: Beck, 1964. 
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 2 
written by an – according to the general policy of TLS – anonymous reviewer, 
respectively Hauser’s reply, and the final comment of the reviewer using the same 
stinging and unsympathetic voice to address his colleague. On this account, 
Hauser’s book falls short of authenticity and timeliness and is inaccurate in using 
sources, bibliography, and illustrations – signalling that Hauser is liable to 
dilettantism in doing art history. Hauser’s work is, seemingly, also unable to answer 
fundamental questions raised by the philosophy of art history: why is an artwork 
only possible under certain circumstances? The review article was originally meant 
to be a joint discussion of Hauser’s and Daniel Rowland’s4 new books, but almost 
exclusively comments on the two weighty tomes of the Hungarian-born scholar. In 
the review article, one can find a single passage on Rowland himself used as a 
stepping stone to, once more, castigate Hauser. According to the archives of TLS,5 
the text in question was written by art historian Keith Andrews, then archivist at the 
National Gallery of Scotland.6 
Andrews’ articles – and the less inspired answer of the clearly frustrated 
author initially charged with superficiality – are good illustrations of completely 
parallel professional agendas. We also have to mention that Andrews’ choice to 
publish his initial critique had fallen on a non-academic journal, therefore the 
ensuing reaction to Hauser’s answer should be interpreted as an outer-academic 
sedimentation of scholarly debates on the proper form to assessing central features 
 
4 Daniel B. Rowland, Mannerism – Style and Mood. An Anatomy of Four Works in Three Art 
Forms [Yale College Series, Vol. 2], New Haven–London: Yale UP, 1964. 
5 I wish to thank Sam Graydon from TLS for providing me information about the authorship 
of the review. On the following pages all notes and commentaries, unless signalled, are 
mine. All three texts were found in Hauser’s personal files kept by his heirs in Budapest, 
Hungary. The image of the original manuscript (fig.1) is reproduced with the kind 
permission of Hauser’s assigns. In collating the documents pertaining to Hauser’s literary 
literary estates I’ve been supported by the caring help of Ákos Sivadó from Research Centre 
for the Humanities, Budapest. He should be credited for finding Andrews’ review among 
Hauser’s personal collection of articles citing his own published works. Hereby I wish to 
thank Csilla Markója, and the Research Group for Art Historiography at Research Centre for 
the Humanities for putting me in contact with Hauser’s heirs. 
6 Keith Andrews was born Kurt Aufrichtig in Hamburg, Germany on 11th October 1920, and 
died on 4th April 1989 in Edinburgh. One of his greatest achievements is the monograph on 
the nineteenth century Nazarene movement, (Keith Andrews, The Nazarenes. A Brotherhood of 
German Artists in Rome, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.). Christopher White’s obituary is a 
good testimony to Andrew’s professional habitus and method also evidenced in the Hauser-
review published below. White says: ‘His catalogues are remarkable records of industry and 
achievement. Whereas increasingly print room curators flit around the world as part of the 
international exhibition circus to the detriment of work on the permanent collection, Keith, 
apart from carefully planned journeys abroad mainly for research stayed at home and got on 
with the essential duties of a print-room curator.’ (Christopher White, ‘Keith Andrews’, The 
Burlington Magazine, 131/1039, October 1989, 707.) Surprisingly, Andrews is not to be found 
in the Dictionary of Art Historians, but – due to his contributions to the research of German 
artists in the diaspora – his name was included in the Deutsche Biographie. See: 
https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd132193914.html [17.11.2019]. 
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 3 
of sixteenth century European art.7 A quick look on Hauser’s bibliographical 
references makes us conjecture that he was only partly aware of then-contemporary 
proceedings in the historiography of Mannerism. A second conjecture could also 
emerge that Andrews deliberately put this discussion outside of the academic field 
to signal that Hauser’s take on the crisis of the Renaissance and the origins of 
modern art is a ‘philosophical’ enterprise, an ‘essay’ (in the sense of an attempt) and 
not a product of art historical diligence. 
 
Hauser’s book, Andrews’ review, and the 1965 Manchester exhibition 
 
Hauser’s book is almost exclusively indebted to the thesis that history makes sense 
if, and only if, it precipitates an understanding of the present. Conversely, some 
present evolutions in art and literature make it easier to investigate similar patterns 
and epochs of the centuries past.8 Direct access to crises and shocks of contemporary 
history helps us understand the very basic structure of crises and disturbances 
experienced by our ancestors. Specific data are, accordingly, subordinate to the 
general structural framework in which they are nested. In line with these main 
ideas, Hauser ushered in neither a new paradigm in the international scholarship on 
Mannerism, nor a startling investigation of the social background of artworks from 
the mid-sixteenth century. His synoptic view was dominated by a general 
philosophy of history and put aside all the special issues in the methodology of 
historical research. One can admit that a practicing art historian can marvel at 
Hauser’s mediocrity in the criticism of historical sources. Consequently, his 
synthetic account on the nature of Mannerism as a product of crises, political and 
economic insecurity proves to be a bold mixture of interpretive Marxism, cultural 
history and his own philosophy of art history investigating mainly the interrelation of 
creativity and conventions. Although the Mannerism-book was a direct sequel to his 
1958 Philosophy of Art History, Hauser was following the line of argumentation he 
 
7 A few years before Hauser’s book was published, the Twentieth International Congress of 
the History of Art in New York had delivered a synthesis of developments in the 
historiography of Mannerism. Hauser never made reference to the proceedings of that 
Congress. Comprehensive surveys of the actual state of its improvements and variations can 
be found in the following publications: Jan Białostocki, ‘Der Manierismus zwischen Triumph 
und Dämmerung. Ein Forschungsbericht’, Stil und Ikonographie. Studien zur Kunstwissenschaft, 
Dresden, 1966 (1964), 83–105; Elisabeth Cropper, ‘Introduction’, Craig Hugh Smyth: 
Mannerism and Maniera, Vienna: Irsa, 1992; Paul van den Akker, Looking for Lines. Theories of 
the Essence of Art and the Problem of Mannerism, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2010; Hans Aurenhammer, ‘Manier, Manierismus, maniera. Zur Geschichte eines 
kontroversen Begriffs’, Maniera. Pontormo, Bronzino und das Florenz der Medici, Ed. Bastian 
Eclercy, Frankfurt: Städel Museum/München–London–New York: Prestel, 2016, 15–23. 
We will come back later to the contributions of this Congress to frame the concept of 
Mannerism. 
8 Arnold Hauser, Mannerism. The Crisis of the Renaissance and the Origin of Modern Art, Vol. I: 
Text, Vol. II: Plates, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965. Here see: Vol. I, 4: ‘The path that 
led to the revaluation of Mannerism was laid by modern expressionism, surrealism and 
abstract art […]. A revaluation of Mannerism was feasible only for a generation which has 
experienced a shock like that associated with the origin of modern art.’ 
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started more than a decade before in the Social History of Art in which he distances 
himself from the model that antiquity had a normative role in the development of 
modern art.9 Modern art is not a deviation of artistic means from the ends set by the 
classical canon, but, like Mannerism, it is a subjective depiction of a severe social 
convulsion. The specificity of the book on Mannerism is, however, the illustrative 
elaboration of how creativity and conventions are correlative factors of creation. 
They are also inseparable tools of every scholar trying to grasp the essence of artistic 
activity.10 
Andrews’ review is, from the onset, an act of total rejection and his initially 
mild criticism turns into a downpour of denigrating comments. The author’s 
starting point is an exhibition hosted by Manchester City Gallery from the 10th of 
March to the 6th of April 1965, titled: Between Renaissance and Baroque: European Art 
1520-1600. The so-called ‘Mannerism’ display curated by Friedrich Georg 
Grossmann was an emblematic event that marked the further definition of 
Mannerism, the description of its content and its psychological, and sociological, 
background.11 However, it was not the first event of this kind after the 1939-1945 
war that made sixteenth century art and its contemporary scholarly evaluation 
accessible to a wider public.12 The 1965 Manchester exhibition had the explicit 
intention to critically challenge the use of the term ‘Mannerism’ as a common 
denominator for ‘triumphant’ European art created from the late period of 
Michelangelo to El Greco. The main idea flowing from Grossmann’s conception was 
that the ‘essence’ of the epoch in question is highly elusive and that it is even more 
difficult to constitute a precise definition of it.13 The exhibition itself was an in-depth 
survey of Mannerist art in general. It catalysed the discussions on sixteenth century 
European artistic production and addressed the divide between two ways of 
assessment: the first, for short, ‘criseological’ interpretation of Mannerism, which 
 
9 See Born, ‘The World Art Histories’, 15. 
10 Hauser starts his book on Mannerism with the following remark: ‘I have been repeatedly 
reminded since the appearance of my Philosophy of Art History in 1959 [the German edition is 
from 1958] that that work did not deal thoroughly enough, as I myself was the first person to 
point out, with one of the main problems raised in it, that of convention in art [...]. I should 
like now to remedy this shortcoming [...].’ Hauser, Mannerism, Vol. I, xvii. 
11 The catalogue prepared by Grossman in collaboration with Elisabeth Johnston (Keeper of 
the Paintings) lists 462 items (paintings, prints, sculptures, and tapestries). 
12 In 1955 the Rijksmuseum organized a public display under the title of De triomf van het 
Maniërisme. De Europese stijl van Michelangelo tot El Greco [The Triumph of Mannerism. The 
European Style from Michelangelo to El Greco]. For further analysis, see van den Akker, 
Looking for lines, 103–107. 
13 See: ‘Editorial’, The Burlington Magazine, 107/745, April 1965, 171. Here the author states 
that ‘Dr. Grossmann was careful to avoid the word ’Mannerism’ in the title of this 
remarkable exhibition’, because of the highly problematic contents of a concept endowed 
with an extreme but vague flexibility: ‘[...] whenever we used the term ’Mannerism’ we 
thought we knew what we are talking about, even thought as time went on and we came to 
unmask more and more, efforts to define the term grew increasingly frantic, conscious as we 
became that it was losing its meaning for us.’ (‘Editorial’, 171.) 
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originated in Max Dvořák’s 1920 October Vienna lectures;14 and the second, less 
interpretive, but analytical one – questioning it as a unitary style – advocated by 
Ernst H. Gombrich and many others.15 Gombrich’s texts were initially motivated by 
the aim to exclude from authentic scientific research all of the ‘holistic’ historians 
and theorists, who were interested in Mannerism as a full-fledged concept for 
sixteenth century pictorial style. But the historical figure of Dvořák could not been 
rendered thoroughly holistic based on his historiographical judgements. It is true 
that Dvořák, being an idiosyncratic follower of Riegl’s method, transformed 
problems of art history into problems of intellectual history, and established tight 
links between observation and ‘world view’, between the historical gaze of elaborate 
research and the reconstruction of a global outlook. Still, one cannot but emphasize 
with Julius von Schlosser that Dvořák’s later works follow a ‘double track’: ‘a 
parallel movement of stylistic history and cultural history fusing those elements 
requiring an aesthetic reading with those of a logical historical nature’.16 Moreover, 
his ideas about the process of concept-building were clearly closer to a functionalist 
view: on the first plane, he advocated for ‘Mannerism’ as a style; on the second, the 
masters, who were to be considered Mannerists, received their distinctive features 
from a common critical-reflexive relation to declining classical ideas of pictorial 
representation. These relations are functionally similar (documenting a personal, 
spiritual, anti-classicist approach) but not identical in their content.17 
 
14 After Dvořák’s sudden death his lecture held at the Austrian Museum for Art and 
Industry (today: The Austrian Museum of Applied Arts) under the Title Über Greco und den 
Manierismus (On Greco and Mannerism) was published from his Nachlass by his assistants Karl 
Maria Swoboda, and Johannes Wilde (Max Dvořák, ‘Über Greco und den Manierismus’, 
Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte. Studien zur abendländischen Kunstentwicklung, eds Karl 
Maria Swoboda–Johannes Wilde, Mücher: Piper, 1924, 259–276.) His views were adopted 
subsequently by many art historians verging on the sixteenth century parallels that uncover 
the basic motivations of modern art. In spite of the fact that many interpreters were 
considering mainly the ‘late’ (postwar) Dvořák (see Otto Kurz, ‘Julius von Schlosser. 
Personalitá, Metodo, Lavoro’, in: Critica d’Arte, 11–12, 1955, 402–419.), a clear and objective 
split of his oeuvre could not be easily made. In a 1914 article he fought for a well-balanced 
description of the motivating factors behind artistic creation. The social environment or the 
global outlook of an epoch are valuable scholarly markers but they must be applied only if 
the investigation of individual artworks is completed and their psychological background is 
clarified. See: Max Dvořák, ‘Über die dringendsten methodischen Erfordernisse der 
Erziehung zur kunstgeschichtlichen Forschung’, Wiener Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte, 27, 1974 
[1914], 7–19., especially 16. 
15 Ernst H Gombrich, ‘Mannerism: The Historiographical Background’, Norm and Form. 
Studies in the Art of the Renaissance 1, London: Phaidon, 1966 [1961], 99–106. 
16 Julius von Schlosser, ’The Vienna School of the History of Art - review of a century of 
Austrian scholarship in German’, translated and edited by Karl Johns, Journal of Art 
Historiography, 1, December 2009, 42. Later in the text Schlosser adds the following: ‘[As 
analyzed by Dvořák] the work of art is placed in the opposite spot from that of those strict 
formalists who would degrade it to a pure document of style and nothing else, allowing it to 
appear abstractly objectified, but still closer to its primal phenomenon, its creation.’ Schlosser, ‘The 
Vienna School’, 42., [my emphasis – D.Z.]. 
17 See: Dagobert Frey, ‘Max Dvořáks Stellung in der Kunstgeschichte’, Max Dvořák zum 
Gedächtnis, Wien: Österreichische Verlagsgesellschaft Eduard Hölzel, 1922, 8. Frey, a devoted 
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Grossman was, seemingly, a good and extremely cautious follower of the 
anti-essentialist school, highly sceptical towards generalizing notions. All these 
aforementioned concepts must be subjected to criticism. In the official catalogue of 
the exhibition, Grossman rebukes the great figures of Mannerism scholarship for 
‘too readily’ equating ‘the tendencies of their own time with those of the sixteenth 
century.’18 Finally, he does not even attempted to add his own definition to the 
many conflicting ones for he saw that the general outlook or a wider meaningful 
totality of an epoch is simply not discernable. 
The Burlington Magazine’s editorial goes even farther and gets very close to 
suggesting that the ‘concept’ of Mannerism should be neglected when proper 
empirical research is carried out: 
 
‘The concept of Mannerism prevents us from seeing what we are looking at, 
and we must ignore it, if we are to make any progress […]. We must re-enter 
the analytical stage and concentrate on details; new concepts will emerge out 
of new researches.’19 
 
In the eye of the professionals, Mannerism was a problematic term 
requesting careful analysis. In the eyes of Grossmann and others, this balance was, 
however, not to be redressed through the delimitation of a central core of Mannerist 
‘style’. If a consensus view had to be established, it would be at the expense of 
overseeing the difficult cases of individual artworks.20 Analytical methods were, if 
not superior to synthetic frameworks, just more sober and self-contained. The word 
‘Mannerism’ should be used as an auxiliary term. The term names scholarly 
research, which studies a specific period of producing artworks. By defining 
Mannerism in this way, one could be rid of synthetic perplexities. The editorial 
quoted above applies this line of argument to Hauser’s itself: 
 
‘If it is still legitimate to employ the term ‘Mannerism’ at all, as it is in the 
titles of Professor Würtenberger’s and Dr. Hauser’s latest volumes, it should 
survive in our vocabulary only as a shorthand description of a given range 
of years.’21  
                                                                                                                                          
pupil of Dvořák’s, makes a clear allusion to the functionalist account of Ernst Cassirer given 
in his 1910 book: Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der 
Erkenntniskritik, Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1910. 
18 F. G. Grossmann, ‘[Preface]’, European Art between Renaissance and Baroque. European Art 
1520–1600 [Exhibition catalogue], Manchester: City Art Gallery, 1965, 6. He also admits that 
the sympathetic spirit of the 1920s scholars working on Mannerism ‘was no doubt due in no 
small measure to the spiritual and anti-naturalistic trends of contemporary art.’ (5–6) 
19 ‘Editorial’, The Burlington Magazine, 171. 
20 Gérard Mermoz (‘Essence, reference and truth-value: the epistemological dimension of the 
critical text’, Art Criticism since 1990, Ed.: Malcolm Gee, Manchester: Manchester UP, 1993, 
48–67) gives a similar interpretation to most of the theoretical concepts coined by art 
historians. 
21 ‘Editorial’, The Burlington Magazine, 171. See also, Franzsepp Würtenberger, Mannerism. 
The European Style of the Sixteenth Century [orig. in German entitled: Der Manierismus; der 
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 Hauser’s reviewers were of course not unanimous (i.e. not mostly negative) 
in their diagnoses. The more they consider Hauser’s philosophical aims and 
interests in drawing a bigger picture of sixteenth century art, the closer they got to 
appreciate his efforts.22 Outside of academia, the opinions of general readers were 
favourable towards his book, probably because it entered the market for 
representative art history compendia. It was of lesser importance to the book’s 
market value that Hauser aimed at delivering a social history of art, which explicitly 
stood aside from reducing artistic to economic value. Denys Sutton’s article from the 
Apollo Magazine is good example of appreciation and is conscious of those potential 
views contesting the work’s basic virtues (which are, still, guarantees of its success 
as didactic material): 
 
‘This is one of those historical treatises which view the past with the eye of 
the present. It may turn out that the specialist will fault some of its findings 
and dispute some of its conclusions; yet even the most blasé student of its 
subject will be intrigued and inspired by the way in which this vast and 
intricate theme is treated.’23 
 
Then-contemporary perspectives on Mannerism 
 
We will need a deeper understanding of then-contemporary academic debates, if 
wanting to understand Andrews’ harsh critique of the content and actuality of 
Hauser’s book. The main fracture lines in interpreting Mannerism were set earlier 
by the 1961 International Congress of the History of Art 24 supporting Ernst 
                                                                                                                                          
europäische Stil des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts, Vienna: A. Schroll, 1962], New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1963. 
22 Robert M. Burgess stresses two philosophical-theoretical traits of Hauser’s work: his 
interest in considering art as a dynamic system of conventions and creativity, respectively 
his approach to see the difference of Mannerism and Baroque through the lens of the 
Cartesian based methods of analysis and synthesis (Mannerism being the ’analytical’ form of 
inquiry). See: R. M. Burgess, ‘Mannerism in Philippe Desportes’, L’Esprit Créateur, 6/4, 
Winter 1966, 270–281. 
23 Denys Sutton, ‘Mannerism: The Art of Permanent Ambiguity’, Apollo Magazine, 1965/3, 
224. For further positive reviews see: Francis Steegmuller, ‘Union of Opposites’, The New 
York Times Book Review, 10th January 1966; Derek Rogers, ‘Mannerism Examined’, The Arts 
Review, 20th March 1965; Edward Lucie-Smith, ‘Mannerism and Modernism’, The Listener, 18th 
March 1965. 
24 The complete preliminary program of the Congress had been published in the Art Journal 
XX/2, Summer 1961. According to it, the section discussing ’Recent Concepts of Mannerism’ 
on 11th of September was to be chaired by Ernst Gombrich with the assistance of Norman W. 
Cannedy. The contributors were: Frederick Hartt, Wolfgang Lotz, E. K. J. Reznicek, John 
Shearman, and Craig Hugh Smyth. Jan Białostocki figured on the list of officially enrolled 
disputants. The edited texts of their contributions to the Congress can be found in: 
Gombrich, ‘Mannerism’; John Shearman, ‘Maniera as an Aesthetic Ideal’, Acts of the Twentieth 
Congress of the History of Art. Vol. II: The Renaissance and Mannerism, 202–208.; Craig Hugh 
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Gombrich’s characteristic assessment. His view of the historiography of Mannerism 
was pervaded by the critique of universalist methods in writing the history of art. 
Gombrich began to assert himself as a nominalist (i.e. not universalist, not realist) in 
its scholastic meaning: 
 
‘There are […] nominalists in the sense of this ancient controversy, and who 
only acknowledge the existence of individual works of art, dismissing our 
categories as mere flatus vocis. They scorn concepts because they want to get 
down to facts. I confess that I have more sympathy for their attitude than for 
that of their opponents, but it has been amply proved that it, too, lands us in 
insuperable methodological perplexities.’25 
 
According to Gombrich, despite certain limitations of historical nominalists, 
their legacy is still worth being followed: ‘It is true that we cannot approach the past 
without preconceived notions, but nothing forces us to hold on to them if they 
prove unsuitable.’26 Therefore, Mannerism-scholars should also subscribe to Karl 
Popper’s method of trial-and-error and would have to abandon the key terms of 
‘classicism’, ‘progress’, ‘final culmination’, ‘downfall’ or ‘crisis’. They should do so 
even if the breakup itself is deemed too painful. All of these keywords could be 
directly eliminated through the upsurge of empirical and textual research and not 
through intensive work on conceptual knowledge. In Gombrich’s view, the use of 
the old vocabulary of art styles could also be tested against the issue of Mannerism. 
Careful research could help us to understand that there is no substantive meaning 
of these concepts, and that their most distinctive features should be considered just 
representations of the process of how artists reacted to certain individual events. 
Gombrich’s commentators and critics would, later, stress the accuracy of his 
final question (‘which concepts of Mannerism put forward in the last few decades 
can best help us [art historians]?’). At the same time, they also mentioned that the 
limits of a project of methodological individualism hindered his followers’ attempts 
to discover comprehensive explanatory models.27 
The very discreet, but circumspect approach of the 1965 Manchester 
Exhibition towards a unitary concept of Mannerism is clearly rooted in the 
historiographical tradition, which was defined by Gombrich’s anti-essentialist, and 
nominalist engagement. Twenty years later, this general idea of a nominalist-sceptic 
view of ‘style’ still governed the curatorial program followed by exhibitions of 
sixteenth century Italian painting. These curatorial programs were elegantly 
sidestepping the question of whether art originating in this period could or could 
                                                                                                                                          
Smyth, Mannerism and Maniera, 2nd edition, with an ‘Introduction’ by Elisabeth Cropper, 
Vienna: Irsa, 1992 [1961]. 
25 Gombrich, ‘Mannerism’, 99. 
26 Gombrich, ‘Mannerism’, 100. 
27 ‘He clearly meant this as an invitation to test hypotheses, but in the following decades 
attempts to develop explanatory models appear to have been inhibited by the logical 
limitations of this proposal’. Cropper, ‘Introduction’, 12. 
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not be classified as Mannerist.28 It was considered wiser to avoid the term 
‘Mannerism’ and this is because the abundant variety of its contradicting definitions 
prevented the reader from reaching the point of logical clarity. Recent analyses, 
nevertheless, still warn us to use this label ‘with extreme caution’.29 
Keith Andrews’ address, which stood clearly in the context of the English 
curatorial tradition, could be coherently interpreted using the tools of 
historiographical nominalism. This could be confirmed by his devotion to the 
circumspect treatment of historical records documenting specific artworks. Despite 
the fact that Andrews was interested in defining the characteristics of a group of art 
historical agents (who could, trivially, share common goals), he never accepted the 
existence of a ‘group mentality’ undisturbed by the personal differences in talent, 
financial state, and ambition. His obvious target was to minimalize the use of pat 
formulas of naïve social psychology in art history. These historiographical 
procedures, coined by him as ‘block responses’ and ‘umbrella judgements’30 obscure 
the view of individualistic factors in artistic creation and, therefore, have to be 
relinquished as long as the relevant source material hasn’t been precisely collated.  
The originally twofold (nominalist versus universalist) methodological view 
of the nature of Mannerism was not kept for too long. Starting with John 
Shearman’s presence in New York, and his contribution to the Congress, his 
interpretive source criticism31 supported Mannerism as a tenable concept for a more 
or less unitary (but not at all homogenous) style of art history (against the 
background of the history of sixteenth century ideas). Subsequently, Shearman 
challenged three then-ruling commonplaces about the period labelled as the age of 
maniera:32 33 (a) early twentieth century is structurally and contextually alien to the 
 
28 See the catalogue of the 1987-88 Washington D.C. exhibition on Rosso Fiorentio (E. A. 
Carroll, Rosso Fiorentino: Drawings, Prints, and Decorative Arts. Exhibition Catalog of the National 
Gallery of Art. 25th October 1987–3rd January 1988, Washington D.C., 1987.) 
29 Cf.: Stephen J. Campbell–Michael W. Cole, A New History of Italian Renaissance Art, London: 
Thames & Hudson, 2012, 212. 
30 Keith Andrews, ‘Nazarenes and Pre-Raphaelites’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 71/3, 
1989, 31.: ‘What gets lost is such judgments is that within such groups, who work together or 
have ideals is common, some may be individualists and some better that others.’ 
31 ‘[...] Mannerism does exist, with the same kind of reality (and no more) as the other style 
periods that are commonly acknowledged [...] Mannerist art is capable of standing on its 
own feet. It can be and ought to be appreciated or rejected on its own terms, and according to 
its own virtues, not ours.’ (John Shearman, Mannerism, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967, 15.) 
Shearman’s book first appeared in January 1967 and was republished in Penguin’s Style and 
Civilization series. It was much more popular than Hauser’s Mannerism. 
32 Shearman’s earlier article (Shearman, ‘Maniera as an artistic ideal’) was one of the first 
studies to restore the positive connotation to the term ‘Mannerism’. Grossmann’s preface 
also refers to it as the sole work to redeem the word’s original meaning in compensation for 
the prevalent negative opinion that ‘Mannerism’ is ‘not a very fortunate appellation’. 
(Grossman, ‘Preface’, 5.) 
33 Peter Burke characterized these features as answers to the three main questions about the 
epoch scrutinized: ‘Dr. Shearman is concerned with three questions, what happened in 
Mannerism, how and why.’ Burke, Peter, ‘[Review of] John Shearman: Mannerism’, The 
Burlington Magazine, 110/786, 1968, 525. (emphasis mine – D.Z.). 
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age of Mannerism, which (b) was no reaction to High Renaissance but the ‘logical 
extension’ of it; (c) it is an erroneous assumption to see Mannerism as a style 
afflicted by a deep cultural ‘malaise’ of a society or of a Weltanschauung. ‘Its birth’, 
he formulates, ‘was ideally easy and attended by no crisis.’ 34 His approach was a 
new attempt to recast the positive meaning of ‘Mannerism’, stating that the minimal 
core of the concept is not per definitionem inconsistent with the practice of elaborate 
research, but grants the necessary framework for challenging persistent general 
assumptions. Highly acclaimed critical assessments of single works could be done 
with the endorsement of some general characteristics about a certain period. 
However, they will fail if we follow the unrealistic path of regarding ‘periods of 
style, in themselves increasingly artificial as we go back further in history, as tidily 
homogenous’.35 
Shearman’s conception had, inevitably, its obvious limitations. His expertise 
in the history of ideas didn’t support an interpretation informed by psychology, 
and, even more, by some aspects of social history. Through imputing the pursuit of 
‘stylish style’ to sixteenth century art he evaded the commonplaces of ‘anti-
classicism’ or ‘crisis’, but diminished the relevance of the undeniable social (i.e. 
cultural, economic, and political) determination on the artists’ personal quest for 
their own self-governance. To mention just one possible point of concern, Sherman 
had not considered the impact of then-contemporary artistic conventions on the 
emergence and acceptance of virtuosity as an alleged artistic virtue.  
On a later account, even Gombrich became more permissive regarding 
unitary features of Mannerism based on a revised analysis of his view on artistic 
conventions. Once more, he emphasized that archival gleanings accustomed him to 
managing without the generalized idea, according to which Mannerism ‘was a 
manifestation of a profound spiritual crisis.’36 At the same time, he then adopted the 
thought that Mannerism was no strictu sensu anti-classical style, but a post-classical 
enterprise, ‘in a sense, parasitical on the classical’. In the previous passage, he had 
even given some clues to understand this ‘parasitical’ matter: some Mannerist artists 
were specific in that they were not ignoring the rules inherited from the 
Renaissance, but breaking them in a visible manner, where the rule and the 
deviation from the rule remain discernable: 
 
34 Shearman, Mannerism, 23. 
35 Idem. For further reading and the return of the sceptical tone in the historiography of 
Mannerism see Hessel Miedema, ‘On Mannerism and maniera’, Netherland’s Quarterly for the 
History of Art, 10/1, 1979, 19–45. In this interpretation even those scholars who are careful to 
avoid some general assumptions about Mannerism (e.g. Shearman) fall prey to the ‘myth of 
the disregard of content, by which is meant the immediate impression a work of art has on 
the viewer’ (27.), Mannerism being just one peculiar period when artists exposed excessively 
their artisanal virtuosity instead of concentrating on the representation on certain contents. 
In return, Miedema’s contention was that ‘the art of the sixteenth century [...] is best typified 
not so much by Mannerist stylistic features as by an invention aimed at providing the 
maximum amount of information, whether or not concealed from the eyes of the 
uninitiated.’ (30.) 
36 Ernst H. Gombrich, ‘Architecture and Rhetoric in Giulio Romano’s Palazzo del Te’, New 
Light on Old Masters, London: Phaidon, 1986 [1984], 161. 
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‘[…] it seems to me important to emphasize that licence ceases to be licence if 
there are no rules to contravene. In architecture no less than in rhetoric there 
is an enormous difference between being ignorant of the rules and breaking 
them intentionally. In other words, the desired effect depends on the 
perceptions of a public that can appreciate the deviation from the rules.’37 
 
Hauser as a philosopher of Mannerism, and three levels of theoretical 
awareness 
 
The main difficulty in dealing with this complex of events and concepts gathering 
around the keyword of Mannerism is that all the approaches mix different levels of 
abstraction. The most basic and concrete level would be that of art historical source 
criticism. On the second plane are the histories of ideas and epistemologies 
respecting social history setting the logical requirements of empirical research. On 
the highest level, there stands the philosophical, meta-theoretical enterprise that 
aims to characterize the motivations behind the research of history. All characteristic 
assessments of Mannerism mix these levels of theoretical awareness. Even more, 
none of the above-mentioned scholars, who were performing source criticism, ever 
wanted to refrain from theoretical debates. At the same time, historians of ideas and 
social historians never sought to bracket the everyday physical problems of 
craftsmanship. Last, but not least, no meta-theorists of art history had ever intended 
to fight the ambition to correct those pursuing empirical research. 
Hauser himself acted mostly on the highest level of abstraction and regularly 
assessed issues in the history of ideas and, evidently, in social history. His most 
significant failure was, from a more charitable viewpoint, to miss those synthetic 
configurations Shearman and – a few years earlier, coming from a different 
institutional background – Craig Hugh Smyth have found in the history of ideas 
(‘stylish style’; problems of the artist as a virtuoso of refined technical skills; maniera 
as local post-classicism instead of an ideal type of rebellious anti-classicism38). And 
other failure resulted from Hauser’s general outlook being partly insensitive to 
minutiae of historic artworks and institutionally coordinated individual research. 
The origin of his method could be easily understood if seen under the auspices of 
three relevant points from the history of continental and, partly, East-Central 
European thought.  
 To begin with, Hauser treasured his roots in classical German philosophy 
and systematization theory put forward by his Budapest colleagues such as Béla 
Zalai and Karl Mannheim. Mannheim’s early investigations of the structure of 
human understanding, which integrated special fields of research in ethics, 
aesthetics, psychology, and sociology on the basis of uncovering the primary and 
ineradicable epistemological relations between the subject and object of knowledge. 
Mannheim shifted the question from ‘what is knowledge?’, towards the reflexive-
 
37 Gombrich, ‘Architecture and Rhetoric’, 167. 
38 Cf.: Smyth, Mannerism and Maniera, 103. 
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transcendental inquiry of ‘what are the premises of knowledge?’39. This 
Mannheimian idea of subject-object correlation as a transcendental prerequisite of 
perception and understanding made a deep impact on the early Hauser’s aesthetic 
works. He was always faithful to the idea that a normative approach to the issues of 
‘taste’ and ‘style’ should respect the correlation of different sources of knowledge: 
the subjective-psychological, the objective-material, and the contextual-sociological. 
None of these factors should be privileged in the analysis of art. 
As a second point, one can re-emphasize that Hauser was an overtly 
philosophical author, who allotted to the classical domains of philosophy (e.g. 
theory of knowledge) a very generous agency. Like others40 in the historiography of 
Mannerism, he used a working definition of those periods, wherever a strong 
epistemological shift had been carried out: from a quasi-religious faith in stable 
knowledge and order to a more complex, existentially imbibed period of doubt and 
scepticism. These meta-historical phenomena of shifts and transitions should not be 
restricted to a specific period or age canonized in the history of art, such as 
‘Mannerism’ or ‘Expressionism’. Enquiries concerning the nature of these transitions 
would even help historians to recast the roles given to actors of a certain age and to 
challenge the unity of even more disputed periods, such as the Renaissance itself. To 
form a theory of Mannerism is to build a certain dynamic of analysing the dynamics 
of historical change. 
Finally, Hauser took one core idea of European Enlightenment seriously: the 
philosophy of knowledge, theory of judgments, and moral philosophy are, on his 
account, intertwined fields of research, which have to be in a certain balance to 
avoid strong philosophical errors. An advocate of the republic of letters, he 
continuously pleaded for a global view of these various aspects, even if he was 
expressly interested in the external factors that modify our tendencies to accept the 
image of self-sufficient philosophy, art, and science. 
Researching these different sources of human knowledge,41 Hauser evaded 
with a certain kind of philosophical generosity the critical description of specific 
works. The philosophical balance of his oeuvre, logically, did not result in a 
philosophy that was acceptable by a jury composed of researchers in art history and 
 
39 Karl Mannheim, ‘Az ismeretelmélet szerkezeti elemzése. II. rész’ [’Structural Analysis of 
the Theory of Knowledge. Part II’], Athenaeum, 1918, 315–330, especially 234. Hauser and 
Mannheim both received their degrees in philosophy at Budapest University in the same 
year. Mannheim’s thesis, a seminal work in his sociology of knowledge shared a rich set of 
ideas with Hauser’s doctoral work, ‘The problem of Aesthetical Systematization’ (Arnold 
Hauser, ‘Az esztétikai rendszerezés problémája’ [’The Problem of Aesthetical 
Systematization’], Athenaeum, 1918, 331–357). Béla Zalai’s texts on the general theory of 
building systems of thought (Béla Zalai, ‘Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie’, Archiv 
für systematische Philosophie, 17/4, 1911, 363–422; 18/1, 1912, 1–44) were common references in 
Hauser’s and Mannheim’s works (Mannheim, ’Az ismeretelmélet’, 235–237.; Hauser, ‘Az 
esztétikai rendszerezés’, 331.) 
40 See Elisabeth Croppers concise summary of Giulio Carlo Argan’s, and Amadeo 
Quondam’s works. Cropper, ‘Introduction’, 20. 
41 See Deodáth Zuh, ‘Arnold Hauser and the Multilayer Theory of Knowledge’, Studies in 
East European Thought, 67 (1–2), 2015, 41–59. 
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magistrates of the historiography of art. Yet, it could still open a new discussion on 
meta-historical issues concerning the ways of professing art history. 
 
Texts: 
 
Style Fashioned in Time 
[an anonymous review by Keith Andrews] 
Arnold Hauser, Mannerism. The Crisis of the Renaissance and the Origin of Modern Art, 
Vol I-II & Daniel B. Rowland, Mannerism – Style and Mood. An Anatomy of Four Works 
in Three Art Forms – in: TLS, 15 April 1965, 288. 
 
It is significant that the recent exhibition at Manchester of European art 
covering the years 1520 to 1600 was simply entitled ‘Between Renaissance and 
Baroque’, thus deliberately avoiding the term ‘Mannerism’ which had hitherto been 
applied haphazardly to this very period. For some time now there have been voices 
urging a more exclusive, and thus a more precise application of this connotation, 
and calling a halt to its indiscriminate usage. 
Largely developed in this century – mainly during the interwar years – to 
distinguish those works of art that were felt to possess no longer the classical 
perfection of the High Renaissance before Raphael’s death, nor as yet the 
exuberance of what is now called Baroque, it seemed a neat label for a well-defined 
group of Italian sixteenth-century artists and their northern followers. It was at first 
conceived chiefly as a manifestation of anti-naturalism (Max Dvořák) and anti-
classicism (Walter Friedländer), until Ernst Robert Curtius suggested that similar 
trends could be observed also in poetry and in literature generally. As some of the 
hallmarks of Mannerism were thought to include a love of paradox and ambiguity, 
a tendency towards eccentricity and virtuosity per se, as well as a good dose of 
spiritual upheaval, it can be imagined that quite soon the original definition was felt 
to be far too limited and the interpreters were feasting on the possibility of getting 
to work on a concept so malleable and so vague. The term was expanded further 
and further and in no time the door was wide open to admit, with only the slightest 
manipulation, almost any non-conforming or neurotic figure in almost any field, 
regardless of period or nationality. No other concept among the vast storehouse of 
art-historical terminology, with the possible exception of Romanticism, has been 
treated in such a cavalier manner, with the result that has come to mean all things to 
all men. It would appear that Mannerism, like the measles, can be caught by 
anyone, at any time, in any country, and that the symptoms are invariable and 
easily recognizable. 
It is probably impossible, at this stage, to revert once again to the strictly 
historical and non-pejorative application of this term. Dr. Hauser, at any rate, would 
certainly not act as an advocate for such a limitation. Ignoring all the warning 
signals, he bulldozes his way across any restricting considerations, feeling, on the 
contrary, that the term has been misunderstood and not interpreted to its fullest 
potential. Basing himself firmly on Dvořák’s ideas, without, however, that great 
scholars’ subtle perception, he hardly admits that much has been thought and 
written about Mannerism since the early 1920s. It is characteristic that the 
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overwhelming literature mentioned in the notes was published, mainly in Germany, 
before the last war. Even Friedländer is only quoted from his paper of 1925, as if Dr. 
Hauser was not aware of the complementary one four years later, nor of the fact that 
both have appeared in a handy English translation in 1957. This heavy reliance on 
sources and argument dating thirty or forty years ago give the whole – so far as it is 
not concerned with the author’s speculations – a rather antiquated look, resulting 
frequently in the fighting of battles that have long since been won. 
The author begins by perpetuating the fable convenue that Mannerism is a 
distinct and unified style. With the various artists working like cogs in a wheel, 
conscious of being called upon to uphold and develop something called 
‘Mannerism’ – an abstraction into which any individuality is being submerged. This 
style is being interpreted as having been born out of a spiritual crisis which is, 
moreover, strongly akin to our own. ‘The development of Mannerism marked one 
of the deepest breaks in the history of art, and its rediscovery implies a similar break 
in our own days’,42 we are told. This clears the way for the author’s categorical 
statement, implicit in his subtitle, that Mannerism marks the point from which 
originated modern art, and modern man (whoever he is). In order to give this 
theory, and everything that follows from it, a semblance of justification, the author 
adopts the Alice-in-Wonderland recipe of injecting into his definition of Mannerism 
all the ingredients required later on to prove his various contentions. Thus he has no 
difficulty – working from prepared ground – in parading before his readers the 
oddest assortment of figures, all of whom can be accommodated under 
Mannerism’s capricious skirts: paradox (Shakespeare and Donne); social and 
spiritual alienation (Marx, Proust, and Kafka); surrealism (Picasso); narcissism 
(Proust), and so forth – to give only a small sample. Almost anything can be proved, 
‘within the uncommon wealth of variations peculiar to Mannerism’: not only that 
Tintoretto, Brueghel and El Greco are the first modern artists, Shakespeare, 
Cervantes and Donne the first modern poets, and Montaigne, Machiavelli and 
Galileo the first modern thinkers. All these are either called Mannerists or 
precursors of Mannerism. Whole epochs, too, can be equated without much trouble, 
so one as one juggles only with carefully selected propositions. 
The introduction, entitled ‘General’, is given over to theorizing about the 
formative influences on Mannerism of science (Copernicus, Kepler), Protestantism, 
the concept of alienation (which has to be projected back into Renaissance from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), and – inevitably – psychology. In the final 
section of the book victims ranging from Shakespeare to Kafka all of whom are 
‘modern’ because they are ‘Mannerists’, are inaugurated into the Sacred Circle. No 
one would deny that analogies of some facets inherent in what has been defined as 
Mannerism can be found in other periods and in a variety of arts and artists, but to 
draw the conclusion that before all these can be sensibly called Mannerists is 
foolhardy. The author for instance never explains why the year 1520 should be the 
terminus ad quem for the commencement for Mannerist characteristics, none of which 
are supposed ever to have occurred before. One would have thought that according 
to Dr. Hauser’s requirements (ambiguity, spiritual torment, anticlassical structure, 
 
42 Hauser, Mannerism, Vol. I, 3. 
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distortion of reality), Botticelli, for example, especially in his last works, would have 
qualified for first-class Mannerist membership. No doubt Dr. Hauser’s pyrotechnics 
of artists, poets, scientists, philosophers and their works, will dazzle and impress, 
just because of their kaleidoscopic variety and their colourful combinations, but 
once the squibs have been let off, the containers will not look so exciting in broad 
daylight. 
This whole exercise has not even the curiosity of novelty, for exactly the 
same tricks have already been performed by Gustav René Hocke in Die Welt als 
Labyrinth (1957) and Manierismus in der Literatur (1959), of which Dr. Hauser is 
aware, for he mentions the former in his notes, although with the wrong date. Much 
of the material, for example the highlighting of the ‘concetto’, the emphasis on 
‘humour’ and many of the figures (Tasso, Marino, Góngora in the realm of literature 
for example) already appeared in Hocke’s panorama, only that his list of dramatis 
personae is longer and more varied, and his assertions and analogies even wilder, 
though equally misguided and unconvincing. But at least he writes more 
entertainingly and there is none of that turgidity which disfigures large stretches of 
Dr. Hauser’s text; he can write about Tintoretto, for example that 
 
His ‘spiritual’ rebirth, as Dvořák calls it, does not really take place until 1560, 
when he has dropped his formalism without sacrificing the mannerism of his 
form, that is to say its complete prevalence in relation to reality, or more 
specifically, its independence of proportions and spatial coefficients.43 
 
This sentence appears in the central part of the book devoted to a survey of 
Mannerist art in Italy, the North, and in Spain. This treatment of the visual arts, 
from which after all the concept of Mannerism was derived, is unobjectionable so 
far as it goes, except for its superficiality which even the heading ‘outline’ cannot 
excuse. The recitation of the barest facts with name after name trundled past hardly 
goes beyond the content of Antal’s pioneering article of 1929,44 with the addition of 
some more recent but already well-known clichés (for instance the rather flippant 
estimate of the Cavaliere d’Arpino). It is doubtful whether the author really looked 
with much interest at many of the works he mentions and illustrates, for few of 
them seem to make a point. Indeed, he confesses that some at least fo the plates 
were included solely to help the reader form ‘an idea of the Mannerist movement as 
a whole’, without relation or relevance to any textual arguments, as these had to be 
omitted because they did not fit in this scheme. And even when a particular work is 
pointed out, its significance remains largely obscure. For instance the painting by 
Rosso (pl. 59),45 which incidentally depicts more than merely the Madonna and 
Child, and which is supposed to illuminate the artist’s temperament in contrast to 
Pontormo’s, might, for all Dr. Hauser tells us about it, easily have been replaced by 
 
43 Hauser, Mannerism, Vol. I, 219. 
44 Andrews refers here to Friedrich Antal, ‘Zum Problem des niederländischen 
Manierismus’, Kritische Berichte zur kunstgeschichtlichen Literatur, 3–4, 1929, 207–256. For the 
English Version see: Frederick Antal, ‘The Problem of Mannerism in the Netherlands’, 
Classicism and Romanticism, New York: Basic Books, 1966. 
45 See Hauser, Mannerism, Vol. II. 
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the Pontormo drawing on the previous page. And there is more in Breughel’s 
‘Storm at Sea’ than a similarity in ‘compositional lines’ to Van Gogh’s ‘Cornfield’. 
However when the author discusses Breughel, he seems suddenly stimulating (as he 
is when he deals with Shakespeare), and his argument will at least arouse the 
reader’s whole-hearted response, even if he cannot finally be persuaded that 
Breughel (or for that matter Shakespeare) is a Mannerist. 
The illustrations, some obviously reproduced from old photographs, 
comprise a rather hackneyed selections of Italian Cinquecento art, although among 
the works of northern artist the reader is sure to find unfamiliar and not easily 
accessible items. However is forced to refer to the text to discover whether a 
painting is a fresco or an oil. In a book on Mannerism, the author has wisely 
refrained from mentioning the name of the illustrious baroque architect below the 
reproduction of the famous ‘collonade’ of the Palazzo Spada: but does he imply, by 
the caption accompanying the plate of the courtyard of the same palace, that 
Caravaggio actually designed it, or merely the decorations, or both? 
For an author who professes an interest in the social history of art, his ideas, 
for example, about the significance of the international court portrait, or of the 
dissemination of the art of the Italian artists to the north are rather meagre. Colour, 
surely of the highest importance in Mannerist art, only mentioned in any detail by 
the time we reach El Greco. 
It is difficult to conceive for whom this book is intended. Production, price 
and pretensions would seem to point to a reader with at least some scholarly 
interests. If so, what is one to make of the astonishing paragraph towards the end of 
the preface, where, after mentioning a ‘bibliography’ (which is nowhere to be found, 
the titles of books being interspersed among the notes), he continues: 
 
[…] it should be noted that failure to mention a relevant work does not mean 
that it has been considered unworthy, but only that it not serve as an 
immediate resource for the present work. The bibliographical references 
have obviously and deliberately been left incomplete. The expert knows 
where to find the literature, and the references he will find here be sufficient 
for the general reader.46 
 
Let the ‘general reader’ be warned, especially if he does not read German, 
that the majority of those books that would give him really enlightening and 
imaginative accounts of the essential themes are not mentioned at all. 
Music is one of the few subjects that Dr. Hauser found impossible to 
accommodate into his scheme, an omission that Mr. Rowland makes good with an 
exhaustive examination of a madrigal by Gesualdo. His other exercises in analysis 
with comparative examples, of ‘four works in three art forms’ (paintings by Rosso 
and Pontormo, and John Donne’s ‘The First Anniversary’) will probably have 
earned him good marks in seminars at Yale, but now they should be inflicted on a 
wider public, as part of the Yale College Series, seems somewhat pretentious. It is 
‘not for the first time’ as the blurb states, that the term Mannerism has been 
 
46 Hauser, Mannerism, Vol. I, xix-xx. 
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extended to music and poetry. This again has already been done by the 
indefatigable Dr. Hocke, who specifically mentions Gesualdo in a chapter on the 
madrigal, admittedly without providing the higher mathematics of an analysis. Dr. 
Hauser will no doubt applaud not only Mr. Rowland’s confession that he can detect 
‘common stylistic features’ in his four chosen artists, but probably his contention 
that ‘their mood’ has so much in common with our age that we can ‘for the first time 
begin to understand their style’. 
 
Style Fashioned in Time [Arnold Hauser’s reply and the Reviewer’s Comment] – 
in: TLS, 29 April 1965. 
 
 ‘Sir, – I am reluctant to argue with reviewers, as most criticisms contain their 
own criticism. Your reviewer’s bias against my book on mannerism (TLS, April 15) 
is, however, so manifest and his misinterpretation of my argument is so gross that 
some comment seems to me to be called for. 
In his comparatively short account of a book about 200,000 words he thinks 
it worthwhile to take exception to a caption (pl. 59) mentioning that the work in 
question ‘depicts more than merely the Madonna and Child’, as the caption runs, 
but he fails to mention that the List of Illustrations gives the title in full and does not 
notice that in this, as in many other cases, the title is shortened for typographical 
reasons. By the way I cannot think of a drawing by Pontormo that could replace the 
plate in question, as he suggests. If there are unmistakable differences of style, that 
between Pontormo and Rosso is one of them. To spend a moment more on the 
trivialities your reviewer chooses to pick on, he censures me for quoting in my 
Notes a book dated 1927 instead of 1957, an obvious printer’s error. But as no 
question of priority is involved or of possible confusion to the reader, the point 
seems hardly worth making. He imputes to me ignorance to the fact that Walter 
Friedländer wrote a second essay on mannerism besides the paper I quote. If he had 
read the paper more carefully and known Friedländer’s writings better, he could 
have not failed to notice that I was acquainted with both papers and, in discussing 
the baroque, was indebted to both of them. 
To come to more serious matters, the implication that I consider Marx a 
Mannerist seems to indicate more than a misreading of one passage or another; it 
implies a misunderstanding of the whole book. Marx’s analysis of alienation is the 
keystone of my criticism of the mannerist outlook, and hardly anything could be 
less justified than suggesting that I consider him a mannerist. It is equally careless to 
assert that I ‘equate’ ‘whole epochs’ with mannerism. Your reviewer may have 
perhaps have overlooked the section of the book ‘Mannerism or mannerisms?’ 
which sets out to show that mannerism, like any style has not been and cannot be 
repeated, and he shows no signs of awareness that throughout the chapter dealing 
with the relationship of modern art to mannerism I emphasize the fact that outside 
the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries one can speak of at 
most ‘quasi-mannerist’ stylistic tendencies. 
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I could hardly have made it plainer that I am fundamentally opposed to the 
doctrine professed by E. R. Curtius47 and his pupil G. R. Hocke,48 who assume a 
periodical recurrence of styles.49 Nothing is more definitely contested in my book 
than the assumption that mannerism can be in the reviewer’s words ‘caught like 
measles by anyone, at any time, in any country’. I carefully differentiate between 
that I call ‘mannerist’ and ‘mannered’ for the specific purpose of avoiding any 
semblance of sharing such views. This seems to settle the question of my alleged 
dependence on Hocke. Not only do we start out from different basic assumptions 
about the philosophy of history, but also we generally choose different subjects for 
analysis, analyse them from different points of view, and reach different 
conclusions. As for my alleged indebtedness to Frederick Antal’s paper on 
Netherlandish mannerism, only a minute fraction of my book deals with his 
problems and, unfortunately, in spite of my respect for this author, I am unable to 
agree with either of the propositions referred to. 
It is not correct to say, that I do not note more than a similarity of 
‘compositional lines’ between Brueghel’s ‘Storm at the Sea’ and Van Gogh’s 
‘Cornfield with Ravens’. Nor is it correct that acknowledgement of mannerism as a 
distinct and unified style in my sense is a fable convenue; or that I used old 
photographs for any of the illustrations when never ones were available. In fact no 
trouble was spared to find the best existing photographs, and in some cases 
unpublished originals were used. Your reviewer blames me for failing to indicate in 
 
47 Ernst Robert Curtius’ famous book on European Literature and the Latin Middles Ages (Trans. 
Willard R. Trask, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983[1953]) deals with the concept of Mannerism 
in a truly different manner. Both Andrews and Hauser are missing the point in the twirls of 
their altercation. Curtius coins ‘Mannerism’ to designate a method in historiography where 
we tend to construct concepts of intellectual history with the ‘least possible opportunity for 
misuse’ (Curtius, European Literature, 273). Mannerism as a complementary term for 
Classicism is not stating the multiple recurrence of a given style, but the recurrence of a 
certain and regular reaction to Classicism in literature. Through ‘Mannerism’ one can escape 
the even more problematic term of ‘Baroque’ (n. b. literature) and move towards a minimum 
number of historical analogies and associations. The ensuing use of this concept of 
Mannerism helps to bypass common generalized assertions on the nature of post-classicist 
poetry (often referred to as ‘Baroque’). Curtius makes it clear that ‘this is not the place to 
discuss whether the word ’Mannerism’ is good choice as the designation of a period in art 
history and to what extent it is justified. We may borrow it because it is well adapted to fill 
the gap in the terminology of literary science.’ (Curtius, European Literature, 273.) In Chapter 
15 he rallies round to support that Mannerism in literature could not be separated from its 
thousand years of prehistory and understood after the patterns of seventeenth century 
developments in European art history, and after all calls these kinds of scholarship ‘wire-
drawn interpretations on the part of Geistesgeschichte’ mixing ‘ignorance’ with ‘the demands 
of pseudo-art historical systems’ (See: Curtius, European Literature, 291–292.). For further 
information, see: Blake Lee Spahr, ‘Baroque and Mannerism: Epoch and Style’, in: Colloquia 
Germanica 1, 1967, 78–100. 
48 Gustav René Hocke, Die Welt als Labyrinth – Manierismus in der europäischen Kunst und 
Literatur. Durchgesehene und erweiterte Ausgabe, herausgegeben von Curt 
Grützmacher, Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1987 [1957]. 
49 Hauser levels these accusations against Curtius and Hocke in the general introduction to 
his book. See: Hauser, Mannerism, Vol. I, 37–40. 
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the captions ‘whether a painting is a fresco or an oil’, and says that the reader is 
forced to refer to the text to find out. May I point out that what he expects me to do 
is hardly ever done? 
So much for the facts. I cannot begin to discuss your reviewer’s judgements 
without seeming to set myself up as judge in my own cause. But is it fair for a 
reviewer of a book of this kind to ‘juggle’ (the word is his) with value-judgements 
without proper discussion of its real problems? 
Your reviewer reproaches me for not mentioning more recent publications, 
obviously with the intention of casting suspicion on the credibility of my assertion 
that my bibliographical notes were restricted to books which served me as an 
immediate source. How can one prove in such instance that one has done one’s 
homework without sitting for an examination with the reviewer as examiner?50 
 
Arnold Hauser, 3 Eton Avenue, London, NW3 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Page 3 of Hauser’s first draft for his reply article. 
 
Our Reviewer writes [Same issue of TLS, 29 April 1965]: – The fundamental 
trouble with Dr. Hauser is, as I have criticized, and as he admits, that he conceives 
Mannerism to a be a distinct and unified style, comprising a definite ‘age’ and 
adhering to rules and forms that can indiscriminately be applied to, and recognize 
in, other artists and art forms. No amount of arguing will lead anywhere, if he starts 
from such a premise. At one time the contents of the drawer, conveniently labelled 
‘Mannerism’, were fairly predictable; now, with such keys as Marx’s theory of 
alienation or Freud’s analysis of narcissism, it is doubtful whether the drawer will 
open at all, let alone whether the label has any sensible meaning left. Such subtle 
 
50 See the last paragraph of the original manuscript (both first pages were lost, page 3 is here 
reproduced as fig. 1). Hauser finally omitted his last sentence: ‘Such a complaint may, 
however, give away something that the author of a book reviewed anonymously is not 
supposed to know.’ One can make the educated guess, that this last sentence contains a 
certain allegation toward a colleague of Hauser’s, whom he wasn’t prepared to name. 
There’s no proof of the fact that Hauser knew the identity of his reviewer. 
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differentiations as mannerism, quasi-mannerism and mannerisms confuse the issue 
even further. As to Dr. Hauser’s ‘trivialities’, the Rosso painting (which even in the 
List of Illustrations has not got its correct title), was merely picked out as example of 
the jumbled assemblage of a large part of the illustration, about which the author 
has little illuminating to say, being far too eager to go back to ride his hobby horse. 
This was also my point regarding the Brueghel painting, whose essential core is 
quite ignored. I never suggested that Dr. Hauser was dependent on Hocke, only that 
he performs similar tricks, nor that he was indebted to Antal, merely that his 
treatment adds hardly anything to a paper that was published thirty-six years ago. 
And to old photographs one example, and one nearest Dr. Hauser’s doorstep,51 may 
suffice: if he has ever glanced at Bronzino’s ‘Allegory’ in the National Gallery since 
it was cleaned in 1958, he would realize that it looks significantly different from the 
illustration on pl. 58 in his book. There is nothing wrong with a select bibliography; 
my point was that Dr. Hauser stated explicitly that he had provided sufficient 
references for the ‘general reader’. He must know perfectly well that this is not so. 
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51 Hauser mentioned his actual physical address at the end of his reply. Andrews refers to 
that information in a personal remark. 
